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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
J. DAVID VIGOS, 
Applicant and Petitioner, 
v. 
MOUNTAINLAND BUILDERS 
INC. and 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH, 
Defendants and Respondents 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
Case No.: 960282-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to Article VIII, section 5 of the Utah Constitution, and 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3 (2)(a) (1992) 35-1-82.53 (2) (1988), 35-
1-86 (1988), and 63-46b-14 (1993). This is an appeal from a final 
order wherein the Utah State Industrial Commission denied 
applicant's motion for review and A Petition for Review was timely 
filed on April 23, 1996. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Industrial Commission committed reversible error when it 
determined that "accident," as stated in the statute of limitations 
for a claim for permanent total disability (Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-
99(3)), only means the day Mr. Vigos fell and does not include the 
date he could no longer work, which is when the cause of action 
1 
accrues. Because the Industrial Commission requires an injured 
employee to first obtain a determination of disability from the 
Social Security Administration, the statute cannot begin to run 
until that occurs. 
If the Industrial Commission correctly defined "accident" in 
the statute of limitations, then the statute is an unconstitutional 
statute of repose because it prevents Mr. Vigos from filing a claim 
without regard to when the cause of action accrues. Mr. Vigos 
worked until January, 1994 and then applied for social security 
benefits. The Social Security Administration determined on June 
23, 1995 that Mr. Vigos was disabled. Because this necessary 
element for permanent total disability benefits was obtained more 
than six years after Mr. Vigos fell, he is barred from filing his 
claim, which makes the statute one of repose. 
The Industrial Commission has continuing jurisdiction once a 
claim has been filed. The Worker's Compensation Fund was given 
adequate notice of the facts because they had paid all of Mr. Vigos' 
medical bills and all of his temporary total disability benefits; 
therefore, the Industrial Commission has continuing jurisdiction 
and should have allowed Mr. Vigos to have had a hearing. 
Because the Industrial Commission mandates that an applicant 
obtain a determination of disability from the Social Security 
Administration before it will allow an applicant to file a claim 
for permanent total disability benefits, the statute of limitations 
should be equitably tolled. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 11: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, 
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, 
any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-44(5): 
"Personal injury by accident arising out of or in the 
course of employment" shall include any injury caused by 
the willful act of a third person directed against an 
employee because of his employment. It shall not include 
a disease, except as it shall result from the injury. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45: 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is 
injured and the dependents of each such employee who is 
killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of 
his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the 
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid 
compensation for the loss sustained on account of the 
injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and 
hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, 
such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this 
chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment 
of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, 
and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be 
on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on the 
employee. 
Utah Code Ann §35-1-60: 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the 
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an 
employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the 
exclusive remedy against the employer and shall be the 
exclusive remedy against any officer, agent or employee 
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of the employer and the liabilities of the employer 
imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all 
other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or 
otherwise, to such employee or to his spouse, widow, 
children, parents, defendants, next of kin, heirs, 
personal representatives, guardian, or any other person 
whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or 
death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggravated or 
incurred by such employee in the course of or because of 
or arising out of his employment, and no action at law 
may be maintained against an employer or against any 
officer, agent or employee of the employer based upon any 
accident, injury or death of an employee. Nothing in 
this section, however, shall prevent an employee (or his 
dependents) from filing a claim with the industrial 
commission of Utah for compensation in those cases within 
the provisions of the Utah Occupational Disease 
Disability Act, as amended. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67(1): 
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an 
industrial accident, the employee shall receive 
compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent 
total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a 
finding by the commission of total disability, as 
measured by the substance of the sequential decision-
making process of the Social Security Administration 
under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations as 
revised. The commission shall adopt rules that conform 
to the substance of the sequential decision-making 
process of the Social Security Administration under 2 0 
C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), and (f) (1) 
and (2), as revised. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78(1): 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each 
case shall be continuing. The commission, after notice 
and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its 
former findings and order. Records pertaining to cases 
that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other 
than cases of total permanent disability or cases in 
which a claim has been filed as in Section 35-1-99, may 
be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3) (1988): 
A claim for compensation for temporary total disability 
benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, 
permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total 
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disability benefits is wholly barred, unless an 
application for hearing is filed with the Industrial 
Commission within six years after the date of the 
accident. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(a and d): 
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the 
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person 
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced 
by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule 
on which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 13, 1988 Mr. Vigos fell and sustained a serious 
head injury. (R. 1, 13) The Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah was 
the employer's insurance carrier and it paid all of Mr. Vigos' 
medical bills and all of his temporary total disability benefits. 
(R. 38, 39) After Mr. Vigos returned to work he wrote the Fund a 
letter and stated, "I want to thank you personally for hanging in 
there with me through my recovery. I'm ready to return to work -
finally. Thank you so much." (R. 87 emphasis in original) Mr. 
Vigos continued to work until January, 1994, when he applied for 
social security benefits. (R. 24) Sometime in 1994 Mr. Vigos 
started to call the Fund to see if he could get additional medical 
benefits because he was having additional problems. (R. Ill) The 
Fund did not respond to his calls until after six years from the 
date that he fell. (R. Ill) This was the first and only time The 
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Fund or the employer ever advised Mr. Vigos that he could file an 
application for hearing if he did not like the treatment they 
provided. (R. 11) On June 23, 1995 the Social Security 
Administration determined that Mr. Vigos was disabled and had not 
performed any gainful employment as of January 1, 1993. (R. 23-5) 
On July 10, 1995, 17 days after he received the social security 
determination, Mr. Vigos filed his application for hearing with the 
Industrial Commission for permanent total disability benefits. (R. 
13). 
Pursuant to defendant's motion to dismiss, the ALJ dismissed 
the claim because it was filed more than six years after Mr. Vigos 
fell. (R. 61-2) Mr. Vigos disputed the ALJ's order and filed a 
Motion for Review within 30 days of the ALJ's Order and in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. §§35-1-82.53 (1) (1988) 63-46b-12 
(l)(a) (1992). (R. 64) On March 28, 1996 the Industrial 
Commission affirmed the ALJ's order. (R. 117-9) On April 25, 1996 
Mr. Vigos filed this Petition for Review. (R. 121) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Vigos was employed by defendant Mountainland Builders, 
Inc. (Mountainland) on October 13, 1988. (R. 1, 13) While working 
on a plank, Mr. Vigos fell and struck his head and sustained a head 
injury, and other injuries, while acting within the course and 
scope of his employment. (R. 1, 13, 38, and 39) Mountainland's 
insurance carrier, the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah (the 
Fund), last paid medical expenses in July of 1989 and benefits from 
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October 1 1, 19 88 to May 8f 19 89 as a resul t of thi s accident, (R. 
3 8, 39 ) ! !i: *; :ii gos w as g:i veil neither an i mpa I rmen t .i . : this 
injury nor any i ndication that 1 ICE \ was permanently totally disabled 
by his treating physicians,, (R, fir>)L 
Over the years after the accident, ! lr i ! i gos attempted ork 
several different jobs; however,, because of his head injury ne was 
unabl •] : • (I t 65 ) At s< i)ii€ p o d nt I lr zed 
, ,«,
 : I d be the source of h :i s problems ^ ^ attempted 
r-t additional medical treatment November 3, 
d 
lapse^ ^>i> t- . ih i.^t medicoi -iedUiifcin ^ *. u-*- r^rni deniec 
Vigos ' request f or a ui J 111 m ^ ] medica ! t realm t • ) Th i s was 
do: • • ie ver e head 
injury. ( . ,„ /,-\- i ^  :*- i^pi„:t -f David G. 
Rri'^sen. Ph he state * recommended that ^f -Mr. Vigos] 
"I I 111 i In i i,51 I 11 HI I I it i i ,"i|>n i i,! i hi 11 ( ! ui I mi i in m. eti e 
development projects, for approximately ] 2 months following his 
in iu'y. ,f u M a t: present, be unfai r fc r Vs v i qo? to put 
i ti c i l i i 1 l = r = 1 i :ii s ] :ii ; = •] :ii I: I : • :: • :i - -,:>s 1 ai: ge 
sums at unifi peoples*' [s ic] money are ri d:i i lg ~ adgment and 
problem-solving abi ] i ties He won] d b e w e ] 1 - a r i v i s * j d * p u r s u e a 
•if >ini 'wlllii 11 mi n r i I HI HI • |: aced ,- s I::i: i ie ti ir eel ] :ii i i e :: f ; ; • ::  C-.VUSH It i s 
load and responsibi] i ty as appropriate." (R. 22 6) 
Because the Commission dismissed petitioner's claim without a full 
hearing on the facts, "we presume, to the extent necessary to resolve the issues on 
appeal, that the facts are as stated by petitioner." Velarde v. Board of Review, 831 
P.2d 123, 124 n.2 (Utah App. 19 92). 
Mr. Vigos applied for Social Security benefits on January 25, 
1994. (R. 24) After a hearing in May of 1995, Mr. Vigos was 
awarded Social Security benefits on June 23, 1995. (R. 23-25) On 
July 10, 1995, Mr. Vigos applied for permanent total disability 
benefits. (R. 13) The Fund claimed that Mr. Vigos' application 
was filed after the statute of limitations had lapsed and moved for 
dismissal. (R. 39) On September 18, 1995 the ALJ dismissed Vigos' 
application with prejudice. (R. 61-2) Mr. Vigos filed a Motion 
for Review on October 16, 1995. (R. 64) On March 28, 1996 the 
Industrial Commission affirmed the ALJ's order. (R. 117-9) On 
April 25, 1996 Mr. Vigos filed this Petition for Review. (R. 121) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In a claim for permanent total disability benefits, a claimant 
cannot file for benefits with the Industrial Commission until he 
can prove that he had an accidental injury and that he can no 
longer work, which is determined by the Social Security 
Administration. Mr. Vigos did not receive a determination from the 
Social Security Administration until June 23, 1995. He applied for 
worker's compensation benefits within 17 days of that determination. 
Even though he could not meet the statutory requirements for 
permanent total disability until June 23, 1995, the Industrial 
Commission determined that the statute of limitations ran on 
October 14, 1994. The Industrial Commission committed reversible 
error when it determined that "accident," as stated in the statute 
8 
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During the time Mr. Vigos received medical treatment and benefits 
he was not represented by counsel. He fully cooperated with the 
Fund. In fact, he wrote a letter in 1989 thanking the Fund for its 
help. Alsof the Fund knew he had a head injury that affected his 
judgment and problem solving abilities. To now allow the Fund to 
take advantage of these circumstances is a manifest injustice. 
Because the Industrial Commission mandates that an applicant 
obtain a determination from the Social Security Administration 
before it will allow an applicant to even file a claim for 
permanent total disability benefits, the statute of limitations 
should be equitably tolled. The employer knew all of the facts of 
the accident and was not prejudiced by the requirement to file for 
social security; therefore, the statute of limitations should have 
been equitably tolled. 
\\\ 
\\\ 
\\\ 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT x 
DID THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION IMPROPERLY DENY 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS WHEN IT 
DETERMINED THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
BEGAN TO RUN ON THE DAY MR. VIGOS FELL AND NOT 
FROM THE DAY HE BECAME PERMANENTLY AND 
TOTALLY DISABLED, WHICH WAS SEVERAL YEARS 
LATER? 
A. STANDARD OI1' REVIEW 
T'he question before this Court is a -,.<-st;u,:i I i.aw because 
f Industrie; Commission dismissed Mr. \- • JO S claim v. • i^ u a 
hearing and its decision solely upon the language of Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3) (1988)2. in considering a question of law, 
the reviewing Coin I affords no deference to the Industrial 
Commission onclusions. Rather, this Court employs a 
correction-of-eiror standard
 ;;y v. industrial Commission, 767 
P . s 
1 1 1 L . 6 1 ? p i ? 6 U3L . i ^ t . j j , 4 .* ,
 r . I v J t A v - A w i x \„ . *_/ *.-d L U i. L'Z, - >i v-vv* j ^ J t i l C t > ^ , / J J J 1 6 S S 
i hf» statute * rue— t w. .'ants the agency discretion." Morton 
Hit'J, 1L- _---^ = _riix^ .-. . oi State Tax ("oirmi" n 11 I 'I  I'.'.M nni, 
SRR-H«^ • i * -h. statute in question does m:-\. qi^ii the 
Industrial Commissi :i discretion. 
Since Mr. Vigos' accident, this statute has been repealed; however, the 
current statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98(2), uses nearly the same 
1anguage as Utah Code Ann § 3 5 -1-99(3) . 
B. BECAUSE PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY REQUIRES THE 
EMPLOYEE TO BE BOTH, INJURED AND UNABLE TO WORK, 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SHOULD NOT 
BEGIN TO RUN UNTIL A CLAIMANT, SUCH AS MR. VIGOS, 
FIRST LEARNS HE IS PERMANENTLY AND TOTALLY DISABLED 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99(3), states: 
A claim for compensation for temporary total disability 
benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, 
permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total 
disability benefits is wholly barred, unless an 
application for hearing is filed with the Industrial 
Commission within six years after the date of the 
accident. 
Id. The question in this case is, when did the statute of 
limitation begin to run? The statute states "within six years 
after the date of the accident." However, it is critical to know 
how the courts and legislature define "accident." In Allen v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court 
stated, "An accident is an unexpected or unintended occurrence that 
may be either the cause or the result of an injury." Id. at 22 
(emphasis added). In Avis v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm'n, 
837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992), this Court stated, "Section 35-1-99 
is a statute of limitations because it runs from the date of 
injury, when the cause of action accrues, not from a point in time 
unrelated to when the cause of action arose." id. at 587 (emphasis 
added). The Workers' Compensation Statute entitled, "Compensation 
for industrial accidents to be paid," Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45, 
reads: 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is 
injured and the dependents of each such employee who is 
killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of 
his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the 
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accident was no 1: purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid 
compensation for the loss sustained on account of the 
injury or death, (Emphasis added). 
Id. Furthermore,- :i i 1 the definition of terms, used a t 1: .he • I:::ii 111 s : f 
Mr. Vigos' injury, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-44(5), the legislature 
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In fact, as will be shown below in Point I.C, the Industrial Commission 
does not allow an employee to even file for permanent total disability until he has 
an award from,, the SSA. 
The legislature did not intend to require an employee to file 
a claim for permanent total disability within six years of the 
"accident" if he did not meet the statutory requirements for 
disability. To require an employee to file before he had a claim 
runs contrary to the statutory construction and well established 
Utah law. In Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265 (Utah 
1995), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"'The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to 
give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of 
the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.'" . . . . 
Although we generally rely on the plain language rule of 
statutory construction, . . . . we note that an equally 
important rule of statutory construction is that a 
statute should be construed as a whole, with all of its 
provisions construed to be harmonious with each other and 
with the overall legislative objective of the statute. . 
. . (Emphasis added and cites omitted). 
Id. at 2 68. The statute of limitations for permanent total 
disability cannot begin to run until the claimant has an injury and 
can no longer work. Larson's Workmen's Compensation, §78.42(d); 
See also, Avis v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm'n, 837 P.2d 
584 (Utah App. 1992). 
In Larson's treatise he states that a statute of limitations 
should not begin to run until a claimant is aware that he has a 
claim. Larson's Workmen's Compensation, §78.41 states: 
The time period for notice or claim does not begin to 
run until the claimant, as a reasonable man, should 
recognize the nature, seriousness and probable 
compensable character of his injury or disease. 
(Emphasis added). 
Id. Larson's Workmen's Compensation, §78.42(a) also states: 
A rigid claims period may operate unfairly not only 
because the nature, seriousness, and work-connection of 
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the xiiju. : ;,. -, _,_-.. reasonably b a i: ecognized by the 
claimant, or perhaps even by the claimant's doctor, but 
in many cases because the injury itself does not exist in 
compensable degree during the claims period. This latent 
or delayed injury problem presents in the sharpest relief 
the senselessness of uncompromising time periods. The 
classic illustration is that of the apparently trivial 
accident that matures into a disabling injury after the 
claim period has expired. A worker is struck in the eye 
by a metal chip, but both he and the company doctors 
dismiss the accident as a petty one and of course no 
claim is made, since there is no present i njury or 
disability. Eighteen months later a cataract develops as 
the direct result of the accident. If the statute bars 
claims filed more than one year after the "accident," and 
if the court applies the statutory language with 
draconian literalismf the worker can never collect for 
the injury no matter how diligent he is: he cannot claim 
during the year, because no compensable injury exists; he 
cannot claim after the year, because the statute runs 
from the acoilei^. (Emphasis added'. 
Id. "Il h i - precisely t h*-~ prr^l^n <* * -- h^~ • * f- r^^s^nt 
case •• HI 
lot jobs ^;i s^vei a - yeais, and th£- -. udr:. *-* -: • .i<^  
applied i ^  social .^"ir-"' *-^n^fi*r ^ 199b t K^ SSA 
i l n acco, Jcuice 
with "Title *u . : \ n< • ode 01 Feck rai Rpquiv -ns 'is evised, 
is required jtdii *_ 
total disability, - . n^x. •je^.in. .jt s 
"impairments which atf> oo?»s uiered • •-
 Sf^^r^ n^ <^^ial 
with residualr . •. , - - .»air * < J • u&' he had - .;-: 
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17 days after the SSA determined that he was permanently and 
totally disabled. June 23, 1995 was the first day that Mr. Vigos 
met the statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67(1). 
The Commission's erroneous decision states, "Under the plain 
language of the foregoing statute [35-1-99(3)], Mr. Vigos' claim 
was barred when he failed to file it with the Industrial Commission 
within six years from the date of the accident." (R. 118) This 
application of "the statutory language with draconian literalism" 
does not give effect to the intent of the legislature and is 
reversible error. The statute cannot begin to run until the 
employee has a compensable injury. 
The legislature determined that a claim for permanent total 
disability is not compensable until the employee is both: injured 
and unable to work, as defined by the SSA. In the present case, 
the SSA did not make that determination until June 23, 1995. The 
SSA decision states that Mr. Vigos was not disabled until January 
1, 1993, which would be the earliest date the statute should have 
started to run4. Moreover, the Industrial Commission's ruling 
flies in the face of the Supreme Court's ruling that: 
The Fund, in its argument to the Industrial Commission, claims that 
because Mr. Vigos filed for social security benefits within six years of the day he 
fell he could have also filed for permanent total disability with the Industrial 
Commission within six years. However, such an argument misses the issue, the real 
issue is when did the statute begin to run. If it runs when Mr. Vigos first learned 
when the cause of action accrues, then the earliest it could begin was January 1, 
1993. In following the Fund's argument, if Mr. Vigos had applied for social 
security benefits on October 13, 1994 he could have still filed his workers' 
compensation claim within the six years, eventhough he would have only one day left 
to file. If he last worked on November 1, 1994 and applied for social security 
benefits on that day, his workers' compensation claim is barred without ever having 
been given the right to pursue it and then the statute is a statute of repose, as 
will be discussed in Point II. Therefore, it is only logical and just to determine 
that "accident" also means "injury" and "injury" in a permanent total disability 
claim includes the inability to work. 
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The Workmen's Compensation Act is to be construed 
liberally to further the statutory purposes of providing 
relief from injuries caused by industrial accidents. . . 
. The Industrial Commission is in the first instance 
responsible for effectuating the purposes of the Act by 
construing its provisions to secure its humane 
objectives. (Cite omitted). 
Pinter Constr. Co. v. Frisbv, 678 P.2d 305, 306 (Utah 1984). 
Therefore, the Industrial Commission's decision in the present case 
is erroneous and must be reversed. 
C. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S PROCEDURE CONCERNING A CLAIM FOR 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY CONCLUSIVELY SHOWS THAT SUCH A CLAIM 
DOES NOT ACCRUE UNTIL THE INJURED EMPLOYEE OBTAINS A DISABILITY 
DETERMINATION FROM THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 
When an injured employee files for permanent total disability 
benefits, the Industrial Commission will not allow the claim to be 
filed until the employee has obtained an award from the Social 
Security Administration. The legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-67(1) (1988), which states: 
In cases of permanent total disability caused by an 
industrial accident, the employee shall receive 
compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent 
total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a 
finding by the commission of total disability, as 
measured by the substance of the sequential decision-
making process of the Social Security Administration 
under Title 2 0 of the Code of Federal Regulations as 
revised. The commission shall adopt rules that conform 
to the substance of the sequential decision-making 
process of the Social Security Administration under 2 0 
C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), and (f) (1) 
and (2), as revised. (Emphasis added). 
Id. The Industrial Commission, in accordance with the statutory 
directive, made rules that conform "to the substance of the 
sequential decision-making process of the Social Security 
Administration under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), 
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and (f) (1) and (2), as revised." (R. 80, January 31, 1994, 
memorandum from Judge Timothy C. Allen, Presiding ALJ, to Marge 
Mele, Clerk). Pursuant to the Industrial Commission rules, an 
applicant must include a "notice of award, and a disability 
determination and transmittal or decision from the Social Security 
Administration when filing a claim for permanent total disability." 
(R. 80) If this is not done, then the Industrial Commission will 
return the application to the applicant. (R. 82). Eventually, if 
the applicant has not submitted the required information, then the 
case will be dismissed without prejudice. (R. 84, Notice That 
Claim Will be Dismissed within 30 Days). In other words, if a 
claimant does not have a social security award, then the Industrial 
Commission will dismiss a claim without prejudice because the 
applicant does not meet the statutory elements necessary to prove 
an injury by accident. 
In the Bradley case, cited above, (R. 80, 82, and 84), Mr. 
Bradley was injured on October 4, 1988. An application for hearing 
for permanent total disability benefits was filed on September 2, 
1994, and, according to the Industrial Commission's interpretation 
of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99(3), the statute of limitations would 
have run on October 5, 1994. The Industrial Commission then sent 
Mr. Bradley the "Notice that Claim Will be Dismissed Within 30 
Days" on October 7, 1994, which was two days after the statute had 
run according to the Industrial Commission. Individuals 
should not be required to file an application for hearing in an 
attempt to defeat a statute of limitations defense only to have the 
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application dismissed without prejudice. This would be a pointless 
and wasteful exercise. Therefore, it is pointless for a claimant 
to file before the statute runs if he does not have a social 
security award because the Industrial Commission does not recognize 
a compensable injury until this final element is met. 
Therefore, in the present case, the statute did not begin to 
run until June 23, 1995, when Mr. Vigos received his award from the 
Social Security Administration. If the Industrial Commission will 
not recognize a compensable injury until the SSA makes a 
determination of disability, then how can the Industrial Commission 
require an employee to file within six years if he cannot meet the 
elements within the six years? The Industrial Commission has 
either an impossible standard or the statute does not begin to run 
until the injured employee's action accrues, which is the day the 
SSA determines he is disabled. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. 
Copper State Thrift, 798 P.2d 738, 752 (Utah 1990), "[S]tatutory 
enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof 
relevant and meaningful, and that interpretations are to be avoided 
which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd." The 
only way that Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-99(3) and 35-1-67(1) can be 
"construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful" 
is that the cause of action did not accrue until June 23, 1995. 
This would also support the directive that, "The Workmen's 
Compensation Act is to be construed liberally . . . . to secure its 
humane objectives." Pinter Constr. Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305, 
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306 (Utah 1984). Therefore, this Court should remand this case so 
Mr. Vigos can have his hearing. 
POINT II 
IS UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-99(3) AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE OF REPOSE FOR 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BECAUSE THE 
APPLICANT MAY NOT KNOW HE HAS A COMPENSABLE 
INJURY UNTIL MORE THAN SIX YEARS HAVE PASSED 
AFTER THE ACCIDENT? 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act permits this court to 
grant relief if Mr. Vigos has been substantially prejudiced because 
the Commission "has erroneously interpreted or applied the law," 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1989), or because "the agency 
action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, 
is unconstitutional on its face or as applied." Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-16(4)(a) (1989). Velarde v. Board of Review of Indus. 
Comm'n., 831 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah App. 1992). 
In considering a question of law, the reviewing Court affords 
no deference to the Industrial Commission's legal conclusions. 
Rather, this Court employs a correction-of-error standard. Hurley 
v. Industrial Commission, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988). This 
court must "review an agency's interpretation and application of 
statutes for correctness, unless the statute in question grants the 
agency discretion." Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of State 
Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588-89 (Utah 1991). 
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B. IF "DATE OF THE ACCIDENT" MEANS THE DATE 
THE CLAIMANT FELL AND DOES NOT INCLUDE THE DATE 
THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES, THEN UTAH CODE ANN, 
§35-1-99(3) is A STATUTE OF REPOSE 
The Commission decided the date when Mr. Vigos fell was the 
"date of the accident" and determined that October 13, 1988 is when 
the statute began to run. If the Industrial Commission correctly 
defined the term "accident," then Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99(3) is a 
statute of repose and violates a claimant's constitutional rights5, 
because it violates the due process provision and the open courts 
provision of the Utah Constitution, Article I, §§ 7 and 11. 
Section 7 states, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." And, Section 11 states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, 
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, 
any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Id. In Hales v. Industrial Comm'n., 854 P.2d 537 (Utah App. 1993), 
this Court stated: 
Mr. Vigos' argument that Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99(3), is a statute of 
repose is limited to his claim for permanent total disability. However, any claim 
that falls under this statute or the current Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98(2), where the 
employee has a delayed onset of injury after the "accident," and if the Industrial 
Commission continues to interpret the statute with "draconian literalism" then both 
statutes are statutes of repose. In the other cases where this Court has reviewed 
the statute and the claim that it is a statute of repose, the employee knew he or 
she had an injury at the time of the "accident", and there was no delayed onset 
issue. Consequently, a factor in those cases was whether or not the claimant knew 
he or she had an injury. (see, Avis v. Board of Review of the Indus. Comm'n, 837 
P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992); Middlestadt v. Industrial Comm'n, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah 
App. 1993)) . However, in this case it is undisputed that the claimant did not know 
he was permanently totally disabled until several years after he fell. Hence, the 
issue here is when there is a delayed onset, when does the statute begin to run? 
If it runs from the date he fell, which is not the day his cause of action arose, 
then it is a statute of repose. 
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The difference between a statute of limitations and a 
statute of repose is that 
[a] statute of limitations requires a lawsuit 
to be filed within a specified period of time 
after a legal right has been violated or the 
remedy for the wrong committed is deemed 
waived. A statute of repose bars all actions 
after a specified period of time has run from 
the occurrence of some event other than the 
occurrence of some event other than the 
occurrence of an injury that gives rise to a 
cause of action. 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 
1985). "A statute of repose . . . prevents suit a 
statutorily specified number of years after a particular 
event occurs, without regard to when the cause of action 
accrues." Velarde v. Industrial Comm'n, 831 P.2d 123, 125 
(Utah App. 1992). An action accrues, generally, "upon the 
happening of the last event necessary to complete the 
cause of action." Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668 
P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983). 
Id. at 539. In Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Associates, 910 P.2d 
1252, 1258, (Utah App. 1996), this Court stated: 
Utah courts have consistently followed the same test for 
determining whether a time limit is a statute of repose 
or one of limitation. Simply put, a statute of repose 
begins to run from a date or event independent and 
unrelated to the date of legal injury. By contrast, a 
statute of limitation does not begin to run until the 
cause of action has accrued. (Emphasis added). 
Id. 
It is undisputed that a claim for permanent total disability 
requires that the claimant be both, 1) injured and, 2) unable to 
work. Hence, an injured employee cannot prosecute his claim until 
the last event necessary to complete the cause of action for 
permanent total disability occurs. If the statute begins at a time 
earlier than the last event, then the statute is one of repose 
rather than limitation. This is especially true since the 
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Industrial Commission requires a favorable decision of disability 
from the SSA before it will acknowledge a legal injury. Because 
the cause of action does not accrue until the SSA determination, 
any date prior to that makes the statute a statute of repose. 
In the case at hand, the SSA determined that Mr. Vigos was 
last gainfully employed on January 1, 1993. Moreover, he did not 
met the statutory requirement of permanent total disability until 
June 23, 1995. The very earliest the statute should have begun to 
run was January 1, 1993, which would have given Mr. Vigos until 
January 1, 1999 to file. Just because Mr. Vigos filed his claim 
with the SSA within six years of the day he was injured still makes 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99(3) a statute of repose. In footnote 4 of 
Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993), the Supreme Court stated: 
The effect of the four-year repose period differs with 
respect to causes of action that accrue before and after 
the four-year period. The statute of repose shortens the 
statute of limitations as to causes of action that accrue 
before the repose period expires. For example, when 
knowledge of the injury is acquired more than two years 
but less than four years after the act of malpractice, 
the repose period shortens the time in which a known 
action must be filed to less than the two-year statute of 
limitations. Thus, the nearer the end of the four-year 
period one acquires knowledge of the injury, the shorter 
the time one has to file an action. Conceivably one could 
be required under the statute to file an action the same 
day one learned of it. That might well raise significant 
constitutional problems. (Cites omitted and emphasis 
added). 
Id. at 576. A claim for permanent total disability is much more 
akin to death benefits than it is to a claim for temporary total 
disability, temporary partial disability, or permanent partial 
disability simply because an injured employee cannot file for 
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permanent total disability until his injury prevents him from 
working, which ofttimes does not occur for a significant period of 
time. See, Hales v. Industrial Comm,n./ 854 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
It would be patently unfair to hold Mr. Vigos to a two year 
statute of limitations while all other claimants for permanent 
total disability get six years. Therefore, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
99(3) is a statute of repose and not one of limitation. 
C. UTAH CODE ANN. 35-1-99(3) IS A STATUTE OF REPOSE AND 
IS ARBITRARY, UNREASONABLE AND DOES NOT ACHIEVE THE 
STATUTORY OBJECTIVE, HENCE, IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
In Velarde v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n., 831 P.2d 123 
(Utah App. 1992), this Court stated: 
Although such statutes [statutes of repose] have passed 
constitutional muster in other states, . . . Utah courts 
have interpreted the open courts provision of the Utah 
Constitution to proscribe statutes of repose unless the 
statutes have certain redeeming characteristics. (Cite 
omitted). 
Id. at 126. Furthermore, in Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357 (Utah 
App. 1993), this court declared: 
the reviewing court will only declare a statute 
unconstitutional if it is "arbitrary, unreasonable, and 
will not achieve the statutory objective." . . . If a 
reviewing court closely examines an enactment under 
section 11, it will invalidate that act if it imposes a 
disability "on individual rights which is too great to be 
justified by the benefits accomplished." . . . When 
reviewing a statute that abrogates a remedy or cause of 
action without providing an "effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy 'by due course of law,'" section 11 
requires a 'balancing analysis." . . . The statute must 
be justified by its elimination of a clear economic or 
social evil through a reasonable and non-arbitrary means. 
(Cites omitted and emphasis added). 
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Id, at 1365. In Avis, this Court stated, "even though petitioner 
did not seek a disability rating or file a compensation claim until 
twenty-two years after his accident, he knew of the injury and 
could have filed for compensation within the statutory period. 
Avis v. Board of Review of the Indus. ComnTn, 837 P.2d 584, 588 
(Utah App. 1992). Unlike Mr. Avis, Mr. Vigos could not file 
because the Industrial Commission requires that a determination of 
disability from the SSA must be filed with the application. 
The exclusive remedy of an injured worker is in the Workers' 
Compensation system. The Utah legislature took all common law 
remedies from statutory employees (except for a very few exceptions 
that do not apply in this case) and allow them to only file a claim 
with the Industrial Commission. (See, Utah Code Ann §35-1-60). 
Mr. Vigos has no other alternative remedy for this claim and he 
lost this claim because he was out in the work force trying to 
survive while, unbeknownst to him, the Industrial Commission had 
started the clock on his six year statute of limitations, even 
before his claim had accrued. When he could no longer hold a job, 
he applied for social security benefits in January, 1994. By that 
time he had lost over four of the six years allotted to him by the 
Industrial Commission to file a claim. Assuming he discovered his 
loss on January 1, 1993, he still lost over three years of the six 
year statute of limitation. 
The benefit of a statute of limitations is that an employer 
does not have to defend a stale claim. However, in the case at 
hand, the employer was in possession of all of Mr. Vigos7 medical 
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records, they had investigated the accidentf and they had paid all 
of his medical bills and temporary total disability benefits. The 
only element of Mr. Vigos' permanent total disability claim that 
the employer did not have was whether he was employable. That 
element was satisfied when Mr. Vigos prevailed with the SSA for his 
disability benefits, which he was required to obtain before he 
could even file for permanent total disability benefits. Mr. Vigos 
was denied his only opportunity for workers' compensation benefits 
by an unreasonable and arbitrary means. Therefore, the statute is 
an unconstitutional statute of repose because it violates the due 
process provision and the open courts provision of the Utah 
Constitution for injured employees with permanent total disability 
claims and this Court should remand the case to the Industrial 
Commission and order the Commission to hear his claim for permanent 
total disability benefits. 
POINT III 
IF AN INJURED EMPLOYEE GIVES THE EMPLOYER 
ADEQUATE NOTICE OF AN ACCIDENT AND THE EMPLOYER 
AND THE INSURANCE COMPANY HAVE ALL THE MEDICAL 
RECORDS, MUST THE EMPLOYEE STILL FILE AN 
APPLICATION FOR HEARING FOR EVERY CAUSE OF 
ACTION, WHETHER KNOWN OR UNKNOWN, WITHIN THE 
SIX YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATION IN ORDER FOR THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION TO HAVE CONTINUING 
JURISDICTION OVER ALL OF HIS CLAIMS? 
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A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act permits this court to 
grant relief if Mr. Vigos has been substantially prejudiced because 
the Commission "has erroneously interpreted or applied the law," 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (d) (1989). Velarde v. Board of 
Review of Indus. Comm'n., 831 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah App. 1992). In 
the case at hand, the Industrial Commission completely disregarded 
the language from Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78(1). In considering a 
question of law, the reviewing Court affords no deference to the 
Industrial Commission's legal conclusions. Rather, this Court 
employs a correction-of-error standard. Hurley v. Industrial 
Commission, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988). The statute in question 
does not grant the Industrial Commission discretion. 
B. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAS CONTINUING 
JURISDICTION ONCE A CLAIM HAS BEEN MADE 
When the Industrial Commission dismissed Mr. Vigos' claim, it 
totally disregarded Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78(1), which states, "The 
powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be 
continuing." The language in §35-1-78(1) is clear and unambiguous, 
the commission has continuing jurisdiction over each case. Because 
the Fund had paid benefits and it was undisputed that an industrial 
accident occurred, the Commission had jurisdiction. In Utah State 
Ins. Fund v. Dutson, 646 P.2d 707 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
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Notwithstanding the fact that the foregoing statutes 
[§§35-1-99 -100] require either the filing of a claim for 
compensation or the filing of a written notice of the 
accident in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
Commission, this Court has long recognized that a claim 
for compensation need not bear any particular formality. 
In fact, "great liberality as to form and substance of an 
application for compensation is to be indulged." However 
informal the claim may be, it need only give "notice to 
the parties and to the Commission of the material facts 
on which the right asserted is to depend and against whom 
claim is made." (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 709 (footnotes omitted). Although §§35-1-99 and 35-1-100 
were repealed and §35-1-99(3) controls in this case, §35-1-99(3) 
does not overrule the Supreme Court's decision in Dutson. In the 
present case, Vigos gave notice to his employer and his employer 
paid all of Mr. Vigos' medical bills and his temporary total 
disability benefits. In fact, in the Fund's Amended Answer to the 
Application for Hearing, the Fund stated, "The Workers Compensation 
Fund acknowledges the occurrence of Mr. Vigos [sic] industrial 
accident on October 13, 1988, but unfortunately it appears Mr. 
Vigos [sic] claim for additional benefits was not timely filed." 
(R. 39) The Fund then states, "The Fund originally accepted 
liability for Mr. Vigos' accident . . . ." (R. 39) Clearly, the 
parties had notice of the material facts. Once the employee meets 
this burden then the Commission has jurisdiction. Once it has 
jurisdiction, it can modify any prior awards. Therefore, this 
court should order the Commission to hear this case because it has 
jurisdiction. 
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this case is that Mr. 
Vigos wrote a letter to the employer's insurance company, wherein 
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Mr. Vigos states, "I want to thank you personally for hanging in 
there with me through my recovery. I'm ready to return to work -
finally. Thank you so much." (R. 87 emphasis in original) Mr. 
Vigos looked to the Fund for help and now the Fund claims it has no 
further responsibility. Then the Industrial Commission condones 
the Fund's conduct by dismissing Mr. Vigos' claim. Mr. Vigos and 
the Fund were cooperating, the Fund was paying his bills and his 
benefits and Mr. Vigos was not represented by counsel at this time. 
In fact, Mr. Vigos did not seek legal counsel until November 3, 
1994, when the Fund denied any further medical treatment. The Fund 
sent a letter dated November 3, 1994 notifying Mr. Vigos of this 
denial. However, even if Mr. Vigos had filed an application on the 
day he received the Fund's letter, then the Fund could still use 
the Statute of Limitations as a defense because they did not send 
the letter until after the six years had run! Never did the Fund 
notify Mr. Vigos prior to that letter that he had six years to file 
a claim for benefits. On top of all of these circumstances is the 
fact that Mr. Vigos has a head injury that affects his judgment and 
the Fund was fully aware of this. In David G. Ericksen, Ph.D.'s 
report, he stated: 
It would, at present, be unfair for Mr. Vigos to put 
himself in the position where his livelihood, and perhaps 
large sums of other peoples' [sic] money are riding on 
his judgment and problem-solving abilities. He would be 
well-advised to pursue a somewhat more slow-paced, 
structured line of work, and increase his load and 
responsibility as appropriate. (Emphasis added). 
(R. 222-226). 
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If the Commission does not have continuing jurisdiction under 
these facts, then the Supreme Court's ruling in Pinter Constr. Co. 
v. Frisbv, 678 P.2d 305, 306 (Utah 1984), that "The Workmen's 
Compensation Act is to be construed liberally . . . . to secure its 
humane objectives," would be meaningless. How can it be humane 
when Mr. Vigos cooperates with the Fund, tries to work for several 
years despite his head injury, and the Fund tells him, for the 
first time, that he has the right to file an application for 
hearing after the six year statute of limitations has run? The 
employer's position demonstrates why this case cries out for the 
Commission to have continuing jurisdiction. To allow an insurance 
company to behave in such a way would be an outrage. 
POINT IV 
DOES THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S PRACTICE OF 
REQUIRING AN APPLICANT, WHO I S CLAIMING 
PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY, TO FIRST OBTAIN A 
DETERMINATION OF DISABILITY FROM THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, TOLL THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS FOR A CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL 
DISABILITY? 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Utah A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Procedures Act pe rmi t s t h i s c o u r t t o 
g r a n t r e l i e f i f Mr. Vigos has been s u b s t a n t i a l l y p r e j u d i c e d because 
t h e Commission "has e r r o n e o u s l y i n t e r p r e t e d or a p p l i e d t h e l aw," 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (d) (1989) . Velarde v . Board of 
Review of Indus . Comm'n., 831 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah App. 1992) . In 
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considering a question of law, the reviewing Court affords no 
deference to the Industrial Commission's legal conclusions. 
Rather, this Court employs a correction-of-error standard. Hurley 
v. Industrial Commission, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (Utah 1988). 
B. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE EQUITABLY 
TOLLED BECAUSE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FIRST 
REQUIRES A DETERMINATION OF DISABILITY FROM THE SSA 
Although Utah courts have never decided this issue, Mr. Vigos 
should be allowed to use the doctrine of "equitable tolling" of the 
statute of limitations. Because the Industrial Commission requires 
an applicant to first obtain a determination of disability from the 
SSA before an application for hearing can be filed for permanent 
total disability, this doctrine should apply. In Enron Oil & Gas 
Company v. Freudenthal, 861 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1993), the Wyoming 
Supreme court considered the doctrine. Although the facts in Enron 
Oil did not warrant it, the court stated, "[e]quitable tolling 
applies only where a party has more than one legal remedy available 
to him. . . . The doctrine acts to toll the statute of limitations 
for the one remedy while the party is pursing the other." Jd. at 
1093, (citation omitted). 
In Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, Inc., 772 P.2d 1085 (Alaska 
1989), the court stated: 
The statute is equitably tolled if (1) pursuit of the 
initial remedy gives defendant notice of plaintiff's 
claim, (2) defendant's ability to gather evidence is not 
prejudiced by the delay, and (3) plaintiff acted 
reasonably and in good faith. The statute is tolled only 
when the initial remedy is pursued in a judicial or 
quasi-judicial forum. 
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Id- at 1087. (See also, Erickson v. Croft, 760 P.2d 706, 708 
(Mont. 1988). In the present case, the employer knew of the 
accident and had already done an investigation of the facts. Mr. 
Vigos acted reasonably and in good faith. Because the Industrial 
Commission requires a Social Security Award before a claim for 
permanent total disability can be maintained, an applicant must 
pursue the one legal remedy before he can pursue the other. Mr. 
Vigos filed for Social Security in January of 1994, nearly 10 
months prior to the time Judge Allen ruled the statute of 
limitations ran in this case. Therefore, even if Mr. Vigos had 
filed with the Industrial Commission at the same time as his social 
security claim, his worker's compensation claim would have been 
dismissed without prejudice because he did not have a social 
security award until about 8 months after the Industrial Commission 
ruled the statute had run. This clearly places an applicant in a 
"catch 22" position. In following the Industrial Commission's 
ruling, a claimant must either file a claim without a Social 
Security award and have it dismissed, possibly after the statute 
has run, or wait to file until the claimant receives the Social 
Security award, which may not come until after the statute has run, 
even if the employer has been put on notice, paid benefits, and has 
accepted liability. Because many applicants will be placed in this 
"no win" situation the statute should be equitably tolled. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because the Industrial Commission did not understand that the 
word "accident" requires an injured employee to be unable to work, 
for a claim for permanent total disability, the statute of 
limitations should have begun to run on June 23, 1995 when Mr. 
Vigos' cause of action accrued. In fact, the Industrial Commission 
does not recognize that a claim for permanent total disability has 
accrued until the injured employee first obtains a favorable 
decision of disability from the Social Security Administration. 
Because Mr. Vigos did not obtain that decision until more than six 
years after he fell it would have been impossible for him to have 
filed within six years. Therefore, "accident" must mean when the 
cause of action accrues and according to the Industrial Commission 
that did not occur until June 23, 1995. 
If "accident" means the date that Mr. Vigos fell, then the 
statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99(3) is a statute of 
repose and is unconstitutional because it deprived Mr. Vigos his 
right to pursue his industrial claim before it had accrued. Mr. 
Vigos could not even file for his claim until after June 23, 1995, 
which was more than six years after he fell. 
Alternatively, the Industrial Commission has continuing 
jurisdiction when the parties have been given notice of the 
accident and benefits have been paid. The Fund had all of Mr. 
Vigos' medical records and paid benefits. Because they were put on 
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notice of the facts and not prejudiced by Mr. Vigos' claim, the 
Industrial Commission should have continuing jurisdiction. 
Lastly, because the Industrial Commission requires an 
applicant to first obtain a disability determination from the 
Social Security Administration the statute of limitations should be 
equitably tolled when the employer knows all the facts of the 
accident, has all the medical bills and is not prejudiced by the 
requirement. In fact, the only one prejudiced is the applicant, 
because the Commission will dismiss a claim without the social 
security award. Therefore, equitable tolling is a reasonable 
alternative in this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of September, 1996. 
TSU0ENE C. MILLER, JR. ~^ 
Attorney for Applicant^Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify this 9th day of September, 1996 that 2 (to 
each attorney) true and correct copies of the Brief of Appellant 
were mailed by placing the same in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Richard Sumsion, Esq. 
Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah 
P.O. Box 57929 
Salt Lake City, UT 84157-0929 
Alan Hennebold, Esq. 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
rfft^g^ rr/6. C. MILLER, JR. 
Attorney for Applicant and Petitioner 
017\brief.99 
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ADDENDUM A 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 95599 
a 
J. DAVID VIGOS, * 
Applicant, * 
vs. * ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
MOUNTAINLAND BUILDERS * 
INC•,and/or WORKERS * 
COMPENSATION FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On July 11, 1995 the applicant filed a claim for temporary 
total compensation and permanent total disability benefits in the 
above-entitled matter, alleging the same are the result of the 
industrial accident of October 12, 1988. Thereafter, the defendant 
raised the statute of limitations defense of Section 35-1-99(3), 
Utah Code Annotated. Section 99 requires that a claim for weekly 
compensation benefits must be filed within six (6) years of the 
date of the accident or the claim is wholly barred. In this case, 
the file indicates that the applicant was paid temporary total 
disability by the defedants for the period October 14, 1988 to May 
8, 1989. The defendants also last paid medical expenses for the 
applicant's claim in July of 1989. 
Herein, the applicant filed his claims more than 6 years after 
the accident, namely on July 11, 1995, when the same should 
have been filed no later than October 13, 1994. 
Therefore, as a matter of law the claims for permanent total 
disability and temporary total disability benefits must' be denied 
as required by the foregoing statute, Section 99. 
And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good cause for 
dismissing the claim, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the claim of the Applicant 
for permanent total and temporary total disability benefits be, and 
the same is hereby, dismissed with prejudice. 
J. DAVID VIGOS 
ORDER 
PAGE TWO 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed this Order shall be final and not 
subject to further review or appeal. In the event a Motion for 
Review is timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days 
from the date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a 
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b-
12(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
DATED this 18th day of September,1995. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on September 18, 1995 a copy of the 
attached ORDER OF DISMISSAL was mailed to the following persons at 
the following addresses, postage paid: 
J. David Vigos, 3640 Aurora Circle, SLC, UT 84124 
Richard Sumsion, Atty, WCFU, P.O. 57929, SLC, UT 84157 
Eugene C. Miller, Jr., Atty, 40 E. So. Temple, #300, SLC, UT 
84111 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Roxanne Fowler 
ADDENDUM B 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
J. DAVID VIGOS, * 
Applicant, * ORDER DENYING 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
vs. * 
MOUNTAIN BUILDERS, INC. * 
and THE WORKERS COMPENSATION * 
FUND OF UTAH, * Case No. 95-0597 
* 
Defendants. * 
J. David Vigos asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to 
review the Administrative Law Judgefs dismissal of Mr. Vigos1 claim 
for benefits under the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this 
motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUE UNDER REVIEW 
Is Mr. Vigos7 claim barred by the statute of limitations found 
in §35-1-98(2) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The facts material to the foregoing issue are not in dispute. 
Mr. Vigos alleges an industrial injury occurring on October 12, 
1988. He filed his claim for workers' compensation benefits with 
the Industrial Commission on July 11, 1995. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
J. DAVID VIGOS 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Since July 1 1988, the Utah Workers' Compensation Act has 
required injured workers to file their claims for disability 
compensation with the Commission within six years from the date of 
their industrial accidents. This statute of limitations, now found 
in §35-1-98(2) of the Act, provides in material part as follows: 
A claim for compensation for temporary total 
disability benefits, temporary partial disability 
benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or 
permanent total disability benefits is barred, unless an 
application for hearing is filed with the commission 
within six years after the date of the accident. 
Under the plain language of the foregoing statute, Mr. Vigos' 
claim was barred when he failed to file it with the Industrial 
Commission within six years from the date of his accident. The 
Industrial Commission is compelled to conclude, as did the ALJ, 
that Mr. Vigos claim must be dismissed. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Industrial Commission has 
considered Mr. Vigos' arguments, but finds them unpersuasive. The 
appellate decisions cited by Mr. Vigos were not decided under the 
provisions of §35-1-98(2) and are of no value as precedent in this 
case. As to the argument that the Industrial Commission has 
continuing jurisdiction over Mr. Vigos' claim, such jurisdiction 
attaches only when a timely application for benefits has been 
filed. In this case, Mr. Vigos' application was untimely. 
Finally, with respect to Mr. Vigos' contention that the time for 
filing his workers' compensation claim was "equitably tolled" while 
he pursued his right to Social Security disability compensation, 
Mr. Vigos admits that this principle has not been accepted before 
in Utah. The Industrial Commission declines to apply it now, since 
it is directly contrary to the provisions of §35-1-98(2). 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
J. DAVID VIGOS 
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ORDER 
The Industrial Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and 
denies Mr. Vigos' motion for review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this^j? day of March, 1996. 
NOTICE OF APPEAR RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this 
order by filing a request for reconsideration with the Industrial 
Commission within 20 days of the date of ^this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of 
Appeals by filing a petition for review with that court within 3 0 
days of the date of this order. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
J. DAVID VIGOS 
PAGE 4 
rflftTTT-rraTE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion 
For Review in the matter of J. David Vigqs, Case No. 95-0597, was 
mailed first class postage prepaid this ^ X day of March, 1995, to 
the following: 
J. DAVID VIGOS 
3640 AURORA CIRCLE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84124 
EUGENE C. MILLER JR. 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
40 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE, SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
RICHARD G. SUMSION 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
THE WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
392 EAST 64 00 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107 
Adell Butler-Mitchell 
Support Specialist 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
ORDERS\95-0597 
